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3
Introduction
According to Gallup polls from February 2020, 55% of Americans supported Palestinian
statehood—the first time in eight years a majority supported the concept of an independent
Palestinian state. While support decreased marginally by 3 points as of February 2021, the
majority still holds with the percentage of Americans supporting an independent Palestine at
52%. This increase and subsequent maintenance of majority support marks a distinct shift in
American public opinion of Israel, which has historically prioritized the U.S.-Israel relationship
over the facilitation of a two-state solution with an independent Palestine. This shift is likely
reflective of a variety of complex factors, including contradictory but public-facing two-state
solution messaging from the Trump administration via the Middle East peace plan, as well as
increased sympathy for the Palestinian cause and distrust in U.S. foreign policy objectives, as
scholars such as Malka and Rynhold have argued. This new data also brings up an interesting
contradiction; even though the majority of Americans now support a two-state solution, this
change is not reflected in foreign policy, Congress members’ policy positions, or the official
Democratic and Republican party platforms, which use verbiage such as “unequivocal” and
“ironclad” to describe their commitment in continuing to give military and foreign aid to Israel
(Congressional Research Service, 2020).
In this paper, I explore why the United States hasn’t retooled its foreign policy objectives
and practice to represent the desire of its constituents, while consistently increasing aid to Israel,
supporting illegal land seizure, and consistently failing to facilitate attempts of statehood to
Palestine. I also investigate why American politicians fail to represent the interests of their
constituent bases when those bases do not unequivocally support Israel at the expense of a
Palestinian state. To answer these pressing questions, I’ll examine three factors: first, the
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pervasive created narrative that joins Israeli and American interests, summed up succinctly by
former President Richard Nixon: “Americans admire a people who can scratch a desert and
produce a garden. The Israelis have shown qualities that Americans identify with: guts,
patriotism, idealism, a passion for freedom” (Nixon Foundation). Second, I’ll address the
disparity between American foreign policy on the issue of a two-state solution versus public
opinion, represented through military aid, strategic imperatives and the aforementioned parallel
narrative. Finally, I’ll address this monumental, unprecedented shift in public opinion toward the
facilitation of a two-state solution with support for an independent Palestine, and the failure of
Congress to reflect. By examining these factors, I hope to determine why there’s such a large gap
between what Americans want and what is put into action on the issue of a two-state solution.

A. The American-Israeli Parallel Narrative
In order to explain the “six decades of public affection” (Cavari) between the United
States and Israel that has fueled everything from public opinion to foreign policy, the nature of
the deep ties between the two states first has to be explored. According to Haim Malka in
Crossroads: the Future of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership, the foundation of the U.S.-Israel
alliance is two-fold: first, that the U.S. and Israel “share an exceptionally deep and abiding
commitment to the values of a Western-style democratic society” and second, the two states
share a “common strategic outlook” based on a shared understanding of the complexities of the
region (18). The latter has been validated many times over by strategic political alliances and
defense funding, reinforced according to Malka by the Cold War and more recently, the events of
September 11, creating a common enemy and common goals on a global front. To the first point,
however, Malka argues the original recognition of Israel by Truman in 1948 was not a strategic
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decision; rather, it was based on Truman’s personal religious convictions and “sense of moral
obligation toward a persecuted minority” (3). Not only that, Malka argues Truman based his
decision on the “abstract notion that Israelis and Americans shared basic beliefs rooted in liberty,
democracy, and Judeo-Christian values” (48). Malka’s further description of immediate
American support for the establishment of a new nation in the region based on principles of
religious freedom and determination is telling:

“Early U.S. support for Israel was also built on the idea of a small democracy struggling
for survival against the odds, all while trying to absorb hundreds of thousands of
immigrants. Many Americans glimpsed themselves and the American pioneer spirit in
Israel’s struggle for independence and survival. Israeli interlocutors tended to speak
English well, were highly educated, and espoused a commitment to Western liberal and
democratic ideals.” (3)

According to Amy Kaplan’s Our American Israel: The Story of an Entangled Alliance,
this parallel narrative was strengthened not just by diplomatic strategy and state-making, but also
by American media. Through movies, television, films and, importantly, through sermons, the
U.S. public identified Zionist settlers in Palestine as kin to American pioneers in the 18th
century. Worth mentioning, also, is Kaplan’s emphasis on the “subduing of indigenous peoples”
as a common narrative thread (51). This evolved in later decades with the advent of the Six-Day
War, which established Israel’s military might and further endeared the American people to a
story of “the good fight.”
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This perception of Israel as an exceptional state striving against the odds is a direct
reflection of the American perception of exceptionalism that defines the country’s self-image. It
makes sense, then, that Americans latched on to a narrative about an exceptional state prevailing
despite religious persecution. It’s important to note that this does not align with narrative that
Israel perpetuates: according to Paul Scham, Benjamin Pogrund et al. in “Introduction to Shared
Narratives—A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue,” the familiar Israeli narrative “demonstrates a
justified ‘return’ of those dispossessed many generations before” (2). The U.S. narrative, then, is
at least partially an American creation. It focuses not on return and birthright, but rather on
self-determination and freedom, tying the characteristics of American independence with those
of Israel. Similarly, nor is the bastion of democracy in the Middle East referenced so frequently
in scholarship that Israel has been painted to be a completely accurate image: like Malka
describes, this characterization is “convenient...but it has denied those parts of Israel’s social and
national makeup that espouse an esatern Mediterranean and religious culture rather than a
Western liberal ethos” (45). Malka argues that this fundamental cultural difference has been
largely erased in order to facilitate a one-to-one parallel narrative between the two states, despite
Israel’s own narrative of events, which prioritize specific ordained religious rights and prior land
ownership.
Similarly, in “The United States and Israel: The Risk of Growing Apart,” Mark Heller
argues the perception of a narrative convergence between Israel and the United States has
facilitated a broadly receptive environment for a message of commonality between the two
states. Absent that environment, Heller argues it’s doubtful that pro-Israeli activism or any such
social cause could have produced the outcomes “characterizing American policy over the past
half-century” (3). Heller also argues if that receptive environment changes because of societal
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force or political culture in either or both countries, challenging this narrative overlap, it could
significantly weaken the bonds between the two states (8). This narrative convergence between
Israel and the United States for the past six decades has served to facilitate overwhelming public
support, in order to ensure the safety and strength of the U.S.-Israel relationship.
Another upstanding pillar of the overwhelming public support for the past six decades
prior to 2020 is that America’s interests have never significantly diverged from Israel’s, because
Israeli hegemony in the Middle East is so closely tied to America’s goals both as an individual
state and in foreign relations, a theory backed by Heller (5). Heller argues the U.S. provides a
“political shield” for Israel against international criticism or punishments and in return, the U.S.
has a political ally to help broker disputes in the region with Egypt and Jordan, as well as new
technologies and counter-terrorism strategies gleaned from Israel (2). These points of
convergence bringing the two states together helps justify support for maintaining tremendous
amounts of military support and aid, as will be elaborated upon later. Concurrently, Malka argues
a strategic alliance was formed with Israel as a tool during the Cold War, and continued to be a
tool in the Middle East region for American strategic interests. America has largely forgotten
how the interweaving of Israel and American interests occurred, but this evolving narrative is
critical to the contemporary relationship. The alliance between Israel and America, which Malka
says is built on “shared political and religious values,” extends deeper than any other American
foreign interest (45). He states the following:

“An alliance of this unique nature rests on perceptions of shared political and religious
values; on enduring historical memory of unspeakable brutality toward millions of Jews;
on a common commitment to democracy, rule of law, and human rights; on the
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perception of common threats; on largely compatible, if not fully agreed, strategic
doctrine; and on a web of Jewish family ties that span the oceans, all given protracted
endurance by widespread American public admiration for Israel that stretches well
beyond American Jewry and is expressed repeatedly by the U.S. Congress.” (Malka 9)

This narrative convergence created primarily by America is the background to
understanding why American foreign policy in Israel, as well as party and congressional
platforms supposedly representative of constituent demands, do not follow public opinion. Public
opinion now supports diverging from the patterns of aid and support the U.S. government has
consistently given to Israel. American constituents now would also see an independent
Palestinian state realized alongside an Israeli state, something that would threaten Israeli
hegemony and objectively weaken U.S.-Israel relations. The failure of the government to
constructively or materially recognize or facilitate these aims is explained through the shared
narrative created by America and presented to the public, but is further justified through foreign
policy.

B. U.S. Foreign Policy on Israel
Support of a two-state solution requires the support of an independent Arab Palestine.
The United States was the first country to recognize the independence of a Jewish state in 1948.
However, according to scholar Rashid Khalidi, “yet to support in deed (as opposed to word) the
independence” of Arab Palestine” (21). This is supported by the pattern of investments in the
region the U.S. has exhibited since the establishment of the Israeli state, as well as the failure to
facilitate the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
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Since 1948, the United States has provided Israel with approximately $148 billion in aid not
adjusted for inflation, a majority of the sum categorized as military aid (CRS 2020). This figure
does not include the FY2019–FY2028 MOU drafted in 2018 pledging $38 billion in military aid.
According to the same data, Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. aid since World War
II. Weapons programs such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow ballistic missile programs and
more have received a consistent increase in funding over time. The fact that this aid is primarily
military is by design; in order to facilitate the “QME” or “Qualitative Military Edge” strategy for
Israel, funds go to equipment, training, arms sales, and technology. MOUs, or Memoranda of
Understanding(s), were instituted in 1999 as the primary form of providing military aid, and
don’t require Senate ratification.
In 2002, Stephen Zunes argued under the Institute of Policy Studies that the “stronger
and more willing to cooperate with U.S. interests that Israel becomes, the stronger the support”
(Institute for Policy Studies). Zunes cites U.S. aid increasing by 450% after the 1967 war, partly
due to Israel’s willingness to provide new Soviet weapons to the U.S. government. The U.S.
increased financial support again in 1971, 1973, 1979 and 1982 after strategic victories by Israel.
The United States allocated $1.5 billion in economic aid to Israel after signing an agreement for
strategic cooperation and joint military exercises. In 2012, scholars suggested facilitating a
two-state solution, if the U.S. fails to “reinforce...commitment to initiating and carrying out
peace negotiations,” using diplomatic and economic levers to “pressure Israel” should be
considered (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs).
However, not even internal pressure seems to affect how the U.S. determines aid to Israel.
Generally, bills involving reduced support have died in committees or otherwise failed to reach
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the floor. H.R. 4391 introduced in 2017 aimed to “prohibit U.S. assistance to Israel from being
used to support the military detention, interrogation, or ill-treatment of Palestinian children in
violation of international humanitarian law,” and died in the Foreign Affairs Committee. An
amended version from 2019, H.R. 2407, aimed to authorize “$19 million to independent
organizations to monitor possible human rights violations,” was also referred to the Foreign
Affairs Committee and further action has yet to be taken. Such attempts to moderate and place
restrictions on military aid to Israel, or even impose conditional boundaries, have never
succeeded. Threats of pursuing “legislation that conditions the $3.8 billion in military funding
[of FY2020]” were issued by 12 House members and one Senator during Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2020 consideration of annexation of further territory, never proceeding
beyond a letter. Bills which offer increased funding — either military or economic — such as
H.R. 7617, which passed the House in 2020 and will provide $500 million for joint missile
defense cooperation split between the programs listed above, pass without amendments or other
stipulations (CRS 2018).
Conversely, “bilateral assistance” to the Palestinians since 1994 has totaled
approximately $5 billion, not including U.S. contributions to humanitarian aid (CRS 2018).
Bilateral assistance to Israel since 1994 totals approximately $89 billion, not including economic
or missile defense aid. In 2017–18, President Donald Trump cut $231 million in economic
assistance “intended for the West Bank and Gaza (including $25 million for East Jerusalem
hospitals)” (Nauert 2018), halting all FY2017 aid to Palestine. In 2018, Trump also halted all aid
to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for FY2019, a move widely criticized
by both the international community and members of the U.S. Congress (Schiff 2018). Similarly,
in 2018, Congress enacted stricter restrictions for Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid under the
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Taylor Force Act, theoretically suspending all aid that benefits the PA under a series of complex
restrictions surrounding alleged terrorism and terrorist activities, which are ill-defined (CRS
2018). This failure to commit to humanitarian aid toward Palestine while increasing primarily
military aid to Israel indicates a dedication to the U.S.-Israeli relationship that supersedes the
dedication to the facilitation to a two-state solution, let alone an independent Palestine.

i. Middle East Peace Plan. 2020–Future
The actions of former President Donald Trump and his administration, especially
regarding the controversial Middle East Peace Plan enacted in 2020, represents a paradox that
has influenced the tide of public support for a Palestinian state in a seemingly contradictory way.
It is inarguable that the Trump administration’s actions have been largely pro-Israel, faciliatating
further Israeli dominance in West Bank regions. For example, as in May 2020, U.S. Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo said on whether to annex parts of the West Bank that it was an “Israeli
decision” (Reuters). Trump also recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and relocated the
American embassy to Jerusalem, despite vehement opposition by Democrats (The New York
Times). Conversely to the increasing aid toward Israel over time, in 2018, the Trump
administration significantly cut funding for Palestine after PLO and PA officials cut off
diplomatic contact with the United States after the 2017 decision to recognize Jerusalem as the
Israeli capital, according to data from the Congressional Research Service.
However, the peace plan may not have increased polarization regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian issue; in fact, circumstantial evidence suggests that Trump’s outward-facing
support of a two-state solution has increased sympathy toward the eventual goal of an
independent Palestine from right-leaning Americans, despite the actual text of the plan serving to
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further Israeli supremacy over contested land and the prioritizing of the U.S.-Israel relationship.
While it cannot be definitively said that Trump’s actions furthered sympathy for an independent
Palestinian state without extensive research, this public-facing support of a two-state solution
may have softened the vehemently pro-Israel stance of the polarized Republican right.
From 2018 to 2019, the percentage of Republicans who said they sympathized more with
Israel dropped 11 points, from the all-time high of 87% to 76% (Gallup). Contextually, the 87%
figure was also taken around the time the Trump administration planned to move the U.S.
embassy to Jerusalem, a generally well-received decision by Republicans and pro-Israel factions.
From 2017 to 2020, Republican support for an independent Palestinian state rose 19 points, from
25% to 44% (Gallup). From 2019 to 2020 alone, it rose 11 points, indicating circumstantially
that the Middle East Peace Plan may have influenced the Republican perception of the feasibility
or necessity of facilitating a two-state solution.
Trump’s actions may have also spurred further sympathy for what Rynhold calls the
“Palestinian plight,” though indirectly. Rynhold found that between 2014 and 2017, the sharp rise
in acknowledgement of racism in the United States among Democrats correlates with the rise in
sympathy for Palestinians and the Palestinian cause (54). An article published in The Washington
Post entitled “The Growing Solidarity Between #BlackLivesMatter and Palestinian Activists”
and the U.S. Campaign for Palestinian Rights voicing support for Black-Palestinian solidarity in
2014 indicates the growing support and sympathy for Palestinian aims, potentially sparked in
part by the violence and inadequately-addressed racism that flourished under the Trump
administration.
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Joe Biden’s administration in part has restored funding toward Palestine, recommitting to
UNRWA aid and reneging the Trump administration’s promises to cut off all funding to
Palestine. However, the administration has done little to engage on promises to facilitate a
two-state solution, and has maintained a level of commitment to providing military funding and
aid to Israel at an increasing rate. Facing pressure from both the left for not taking a more critical
stance on Israel and the right for not “standing unequivocally” with Israel, according to Mike
Pompeo (Washington Post) amid increasing Palestinian civilian casualties and escalating
violence as of May 2021, Biden’s failure to take a harder line against Israel in the interest of
preserving a Palestinian state is reflective of decades of effort to bind the American-Israeli
narrative together, focusing instead on commitment to history and values rather than the current
state of affairs. As I’ve established, these policy stances are also not indicative or reflective of
trends in public opinion, which have steadily diverged away from Israeli hegemony and instead
toward a negotiated two-state solution. To fully understand how the influence of America’s
vested interest in Israel on the American public has faded, yet still fails to be represented in any
policy or significant change in funding or operations, the nature of this shift and its relative
impact has to be explored further.

C. Changing tides: Public support for a two-state solution
New Gallup poll data from February 2021 shows American opinion toward a two-state
solution has barely wavered from the previous February 2020 data, where 55% supported the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Now in 2021, 52% of Americans support the
establishment of an independent Palestininan state, with 34% of the total (compared to the
previous year’s 27%) wanting the pressure increased on Israel. According to Gallup, this is the
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highest demand for increased pressure on Israel since 2007. These are slim margins, and the
numbers indicate a higher level of sympathy and support for Israeli government than with the
Palestinian Authority, as expected given previous years’ trends, along with the United States’
vested partnership with Israel and the aforementioned creation of narrative parallels that establish
historical connection between the two states. However, this change is still significant,
representing the first time in eight years public support has been behind an independent
Palestinian state, with support seemingly paradoxically increasing under the Trump
administration and decreasing under the Biden administration, according to Gallup polls, trends
which I’ll examine later to determine how they reflect changing tides in the American left and
right, respectively.
In examining this change in public opinion, it’s also important to mention the way Gallup
framed the polling question, which was as follows: “Do you favor or oppose the establishment of
an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?” While this partially
addresses the question of land reclamation, it does not address the territory of East Jerusalem or
other holy sites, and is specifically based around the land claimed by Israel after the 1967 war,
rather than being based on the bounds of the territory as established by the 1947 partition plan or
any subsequent divisions of land. However, these changes indicate despite the narrative
indicating the public’s ties should be with Israel, these views are not stagnant. Increasing
sympathies for the Palestinian Authority (Gallup), as well as the demand for increased pressure
on Israel to compromise toward a two-state solution, shows definitive public support for an
independent Palestinian state.
An analysis of the literature in the field suggests scholars are pragmatic but divided about
these poll results in terms of the future of U.S.-Israeli foreign policy, given the established
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political history and joint narrative of the two states, as illustrated in earlier sections. Scholars in
the field address the U.S. failure to maneuver toward implementing a two-state solution given
this new polling data in a few varying ways. For example, James Stimson in Tides of Consent:
How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics argues change only occurs when the “threshold
of normal public inattention is crossed” (1, 23). Public opinion is the biggest driver of change,
and thus policy and political platforms are formed by it. This answers the question of why
politicians aren’t immediately mirroring changes in opinions, but it doesn’t explain the vast
inequity in two-state solution platforms as reflected by modern politicians. By Stimson’s
argument, this threshold has been crossed, as the boundary from less than half to more than half
is significant enough to draw nationwide attention, as seen in Gallup reports and the amount of
research published on the developing trend. Similarly, as I’ll address later, the issue has been
brought to national attention by tying it to the Black Lives Matter movement, arguably driving it
through the threshold of public inattention despite lawmakers’ staunchly pro-Israel votes
(Rynhold, 55).
Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page, on the other hand, pose an interesting addendum to
why the U.S. has not changed foreign policy to reflect public opinion in “Who Influences U.S.
Foreign Policy?”, arguing public opinion has little to no influence on foreign policy or
policymaker’s behavior. In their study of the comparative influence of public opinion as
compared to other factors, such as interest groups and lobbies, they found that the percentage of
policy makers preferring a specific policy was “most strongly correlated with the percentage
preferring the same policy among respondents from the media, business, foreign policy
organizations,” followed closely by think tanks, educators and religious leaders, etc (Jacobs and
Page 113). The general public was dead last. This helps explain the disparity between public
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opinion and politician’s actions, especially as Jacobs and Page also found evidence suggesting
that public opinion of foreign policy preferences had little or no significant effect on government
officials (Jacobs and Page 121). However, despite the overarching influence of business leaders
in the U.S. and the seeming lack of influence coming from public opinion, Jacobs and Page add
the general public can have an effect on foreign policy — but only under certain conditions. The
authors give the example of democratic opposition to pro-Israeli government legislation, when it
occurs, dampening or reversing momentum for the passage of laws in Congress. This argument
accepted, the reason we have not seen overwhelming changes in foreign policy for the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state is because those conditions — being a “highly
salient questions of war and peace” and specific rhetorical packaging parallel to media interest
(Jacobs and Page 118) — have not yet been met. Were all those conditions met concurrently,
public opinion would have a greater effect. They give the example of effects on House members
and economic policy as things influenced by public opinion outside these bounds, which we see
align with the rise of new House members with vocal pro-Palestine positions in the last few years
(Sprusansky, 18).
Mark Warren and Darren Castiglioni also highlight an important facet of the scholarly
debate in ‘Representation Revisited,'' arguing there has been a recent change in democratic
representation of increasingly powerful transnational players in “decision-making arenas'' (5)
that expand beyond nation-based democratic representation. This expansion is responsible for the
gap between constituent demands and representatives’ actions. Because of the newfound
prominence of what the authors call “supra-national” forces, democratic representation as a
relationship between constituent and politician has to be approached differently, belaying the
idea of public opinion influencing politicians and instead incorporating it into this new structure.
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Israel is becoming an increasingly powerful transnational player under Warren and Castiglio’s
defined structure, and those decision-making arenas are limited to the executive branch, where
everything from policy initiatives to political party verbiage on the subject stem from. This is
accepting the theory of a joint narrative powering, but it’s worthwhile to mention notable
scholars in the field, such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in The Israel Lobby and U.S.
Foreign Policy, attribute the unchanging American political commitment to Israel to the actions
of the Israel Lobby, a conglomeration of pro-Israel groups that influence U.S. foreign policy
from the bottom-up.
Jacobs and Page also examine the Israel Lobby concept as being important to the
academic field as a way of conceptualizing the power of pro-Israeli influences on politics, but
argue it fails to address the interests of the United States in a way that combines both strategic
interest, and as I would argue, underpinning ideology. Similarly, Warren and Castiglioni suggest
navigating the new world dynamic created by increased military influence by giving groups such
as the Israel Lobby access to formal structures to balance it out. However, this “legitimate and
legal way for groups and constituents to represent their beliefs beyond representation” works
solely if you are in favor of the increasing Israeli autonomy over West Bank territories, areas of
Jerusalem, holy sites and more. This Lobby, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, consists of
pro-Israel groups shifting U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. One in favor of a
U.S.-negotiated two-state solution — with the critical end goal of an independent, autonomous
Palestinian state — would not be able to pitch in their contributions to a collective group.
According to Gallup polling data, Americans are still pro-Israel by wide margins, but that group
does not take into account the parallel goal many Americans hold of facilitating that said

18
two-state solution. The Israel Lobby, then, is legal and legitimate but nonrepresentative, and thus
does not work as an effective method to translate constituent demands into praxis or policy.
Alternatively, Haim Malka in Crossroads: the Future of the U.S.-Israel Strategic
Partnership illustrates another strategy of approach for explaining why public opinion has
shifted, but policy has not. He argues that “profound demographic, social, and political
transformations are reshaping the U.S.-Israeli relationship” (3). The rapidly changing
environments, from a polarized right-leaning Israeli government to the impact of a four-year
presidency under a right-leaning American government, have created a polarized environment
where compromise is less likely and concessions are viewed as defeats. Malka further argues that
the strife between the Obama and Netanyahu administrations created a deep divide that bled into
public opinion of the U.S.-Iraeli partnership, actually increasing pro-Israel groups’ criticism of
U.S. actions and furthering a deepened support between the two states as part of a public
maneuver to increase public support of the administration (18). This is likely partially the cause
of the significant dip in support of an independent Palestinian state between the years
2008–2017. However, given the transition to a government significantly more sympathetic to
Israel in 2016, what explains the constant increase in support for a two-state solution with an
independent Palestine from 2017–2020, a much shorter timespan?
As I previously argued, this may be due to an increase in Republican support specifically
for a U.S.-negotiated two-state solution—a group that has remained stalwartly in favor of Israel
and the Israeli government for the past six decades (Gallup 2020). In 2016, the Republican
National Convention voted unanimously to drop verbiage supporting a two-state solution from
its platform (Kornbluh 2016), and only 12% supported increasing pressure on Israel to resolve
the Israeli-Palestinian crisis (Gallup 2021). However, in 2021, 17% supported increasing
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pressure (the highest since 2008), and 44% favored statehood, as opposed to 25% in 2017
(Gallup 2020). This relatively small but significant difference in support may have come from
the Trump administration’s public-facing front of facilitating a two-state solution, since as
mentioned before, the Middle East Peace Plan and further moves by the Trump administration
worked in a complex way, allowing for greater sympathies toward a two-state solution in the
consistently pro-Israel republican sector. This combined with the steep drop in Democratic
support for Israel from 2014–2020 combined may help explain the shift in public support for a
two-state solution.

ii. The Two-Party Split
Jonathan Rynhold in “Democrats’ attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” does
not draw the distinction between party lines, but rather associates the trend of liberal Democrats’
growing support for an independent Palestine to a variety of extra-party factors. First, changes in
Israeli domestic policy and the Netanyahu administration have sparked sympathy for Palestine
and the reverse for Israel, as Netanyahu’s right-leaning policies and continued push for
settlements drive Israel further from an equitable two-state solution (53–54). Second, Rynhold
attributes this burst of sympathy as part of the growing Black Lives Matter movement, in which
a narrative was created tying racial discrimination in America to Palestinians and the Palestinian
independence movement (55).
The complexities of party identity and support of a two-state solution are reflected in
Asher Arian and Michael Shamir’s “The Primarily Political Functions of the Left-Right
Continuum,” where they argue party spaces and ideological spaces function separately from each
other. Labels of “left” and “right” do not predetermine ideology, which is why it is not useful
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from a political science perspective to establish the “Israel issue” on party boundaries (140). This
explains the complexity behind shifting tides for a two-state solution due to the actions of a
president operating outside the typical two-party boundary. This also helps to explain why
American Christian support along both party lines has remained consistently supportive of Israel
and to a lesser degree, a one-state solution with Israeli supremacy. According to Malka, “the
constituencies that traditionally drove the relationships in both countries are increasingly divided
and shrinking, while groups with very different outlooks and aspirations are coming to the
forefront” (18). Interestingly, Malka implies that “shared values are no longer a given,”
indicating a novel divide. However, it seems for the moment, shared values are still very much in
place. In a 2020 vote on the official Democratic Party platform prior to the 2020 elections,
Senator Bernie Sanders proposed an amendment to add more conditions to giving military aid to
Israel, as well as adding stronger language on ending the illegal occupation of the West Bank and
“Israel’s military rule over the Palestinians” (The Nation). The amendment was overwhelmingly
rejected, 117 voting against and 34 voting in favor.
According to the same Gallup polling data from 2020, support among Democrats for
Palestinian statehood reached 70%. As Rynhold points out, this trend is related to a majority of
Democrats supporting punitive action against Israel over new settlements in the West bank (56).
This is clearly not reflected in Democratic congresspersons’ policy platforms or voting patterns
if the same disparate gap between public opinion and policy platforms is represented not only in
the elected officials responsible for determining party ideology, but also in the party itself. Public
opinion data taken from Democrats shows those who identify with the party are in favor of
establishing an independent Palestinian state. According to Gallup polling data from 2021, nearly
two-thirds of Democrats view Israel favorably, but also favor Palestinian statehood. Less than
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half sympathize more with Israel in regards to the dispute, and a majority want the U.S. to put
more pressure on Israel. However, the official Democratic party platform does not reflect
facilitating a two-state solution, let alone expresses a desire to see an independent Palestinian
state realized. The official 2020 platform states “Our commitment to Israel’s security, its
qualitative military edge, its right to defend itself, and the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding
is ironclad” (91), the referenced MOU allotting $3.8 billion per year in military aid to Israel until
FY2028—$8 billion more than the previous 10-year MOU agreement. The platform also states
“We will help to bring to an end a conflict that has brought so much pain to so many. We support
a negotiated two-state solution that ensures Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state with
recognized borders and upholds the right of Palestinians to live in freedom and security with a
viable state of their own” (91). It does not equate “viable” with independent, nor is an
independent Palestinian state not under the jurisdiction of the Israeli government mentioned. It
also states “we oppose any effort to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel, including at the
United Nations or through the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement” (91). The
language is reminiscent of the commitment to being the “political shield”that Heller describes
against international criticism (2).
The official Republican platform from 2016, which stands as the most current after the
RNC voted in 2020 not to adopt a new platform until 2024, also states “unequivocal support” for
Israel. It states Israel shares the United States’ “most essential values,” and therefore “support for
Israel is an expression of Americanism” (47). The verbiage within the platform explicitly draws
a line between the U.S. and Israel, both as countries born from the “aspiration for freedom,”
which stand out as “beacon[s] of democracy and humanity” (47). The platform only mentions
Palestine once, to emphasize that the U.S. should halt its funding to the U.N., explicitly because
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the U.N. “grants Palestinians membership as a state” (22). Status as a non-member observer
state, which the platform does not mention, goes against both archaic American laws, as well as
the principle of protecting the U.S.-Iraeli relationship.

Conclusion
Not only is it relevant to all Americans as constituents to address the inherent
contradictions in U.S. foreign policy with the projected goal of a two-state goal, it is also
time-sensitive: authors from Princeton in 2012 argued although a two-state solution is still
viable, growing obstacles may become insurmountable if current trends continue. They list a
variety of time-sensitive concerns, such as Israel’s expansion of settlements, the Israeli
government creeping increasingly toward authoritarianism, and the disintegration of the
Palestinian Authority as a competent legal and administrative body. Failures to reach a two-state
solution and put in place measures to give Palestinians legal jurisdiction, have also created
disillusionment and dissatisfaction, which the authors argue could contribute toward
anti-two-state-solution sentiments. These conclusions are no less pressing nine years later — in
fact, new crises are afoot, spurred by rigid American support of Israel as both governments
become increasingly polarized.
Since 2012, the international community has also taken no significant steps towards
facilitating a two state solution, despite increasing support for a negotiated solution. In 2018,
members of the United Nation pushed for Israeli-Palestinian talks, arguing the international
community must take “urgent action to end the suffering of the Palestinian people” (UN General
Assembly 2018). Greater pushes in the international community to accord and recognize
Palestine as an independent state. If, like Stimson argues, a “threshold of normal inattention” has

23
been crossed regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict for Americans, then we should see a reflected
effort by the state to support a two-state solution and broker peace in the region (23). This is
unlikely, due to the parallel narrative the U.S. government has created between Israel and
America, used to justify America’s entrenched investment in Israel as a mitigating state to other
foreign powers in the Middle East, as well as research indicating public opinion does not hold as
much of a sway in influencing policies as other factors, such as industry and interest groups.
However, despite the mitigating factors of growing polarization on both sides, this new divide is
the result of overcoming 60 years of deeply ingrained popular opinion, and is an indicator of the
possible change to come.
In order to effectively see public opinion realized into foreign policy, the government
must change drastically to represent constituents’ wishes, focusing on increased support for an
independent Palestine paired with foreign policy objectives that strip power from Israel as a
consequence for failing to facilitate this goal. Future research might focus on how these changing
attitudes in Congressional party members influence the general public, or why committees
reluctant to change have the power to defeat bills reflective of a changing public environment.
However, for now, public norms are slowly but conclusively changing with the rise in solidarity
for Palestinians paired with the Black Lives Matter movement, as well as warming attitudes
toward an independent state and new members of Congress pushing the boundaries of
“acceptable” platforms toward Israel and the negotiation of a two-state solution, indicating a
hopeful future with a better chance of change, despite the prescient influence of the
American-Israeli narrative.
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